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Water-Quality Standards, Maximum Loads, and the
Clean Water Act: The Need for Judicial
Enforcement
In 1972, Congress replaced the existing Federal Water Pollution
Control Act with what has become known as the Clean Water Act.'
The new Act established a complicated 2 and ambitious program in-
tended to eliminate water pollution.
3
Congress incorporated two methods of pollution control into the
Act. The first regulates wastewater discharges; it requires all point
sources,4 which are primarily industries and municipalities, to use the
"best practicable" and "best available" technologies for treating waste-
water.5 The second method regulates the cleanliness of the nation's
waters. Simply described, it requires federal and state pollution-con-
trol agencies to find pollution problems and solve them.
To find problems, the agencies must divide the nation's waters into
segments, set water-quality standards (WQS) for each segment, and
discover which segments are violating their WQS. 6 To solve problems,
I. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (also known as the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act) [hereinafter referred to as Clean Water Act or Act].
2. Federal courts of appeals have called the Act "confusing," Bethlehem Steel Corp.
v. EPA, 538 F.2d 513, 518 (2d Cir. 1976), "not a model of clarity," United States v. City of
Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 1981), and "poorly drafted and astonishingly
imprecise," E.I. du Pont v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1026 (4th Cir. 1976), modifred, 430 U.S. 112
(1977).
3. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
4. Simply defined, a point source is any wastewater discharge that enters the nation's
waters at one point. Point sources differ from nonpoint sources, which are discharges that
enter at many points. Some discharges do not fit neatly in either category. See infra note 59.
5. Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Congress dele-
gated the responsibility of defining these terms to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency. Id. § 304(c)-(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(c)-(d). The definitions now extend for hundreds
of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations. 40 C.F.R. §§ 125, 401-460 (1982).
6. The Clean Water Act does not use the words segment and segmentation, but these
words usefully describe how the Act works. The concept is implicit in § 303(c), which orders
the states to classify waters according to their uses; it is explicit in § 303(d)(1)(A), which
requires the states to identify "those waters" in which they expect WQS violations. Clean
Water Act § 303(c)-(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)-(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See also Mississippi
Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1271-72 (5th Cir. 1980); Water
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the agencies must establish maximum loads. 7 A maximum load, as de-
fined by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is
the greatest amount of a pollutant that can be discharged into a seg-
ment without causing a violation of WQS.8
Confusion surrounds the statutory requirement for maximum
loads. There is uncertainty about the legal obligations of pollution-
control agencies, 9 the deadlines,'0 the extent of federal powers," and
the scientific relationships between wastewater discharges and water
quality. 12 EPA's definition may be too narrow for successful imple-
mentation of the Act. This Comment suggests that Congress intended
maximum loads to be comprehensive cleanup plans for ensuring com-
pliance with WQS.
13
In 1972, Congress optimistically expected all waters to be clean
within a few years, 14 but many waters remain dirty.15 One reason for
Quality Standards Regulation, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,234, at 49,235 (1982). A segment may be a
lake, part of a river, or any other division a state chooses. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(o) (1976)
(definition of segment) (superseded in 1979 by 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.1500-.1550).
7. See Clean Water Act §§ 301(b)(1)(C), 303(d). 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 l(b)(l)(C). 1313(d)
(1976). Maximum loads must "be established at a level necessary to implement the applica-
ble water quality standards .... " Id. § 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
8. EPA has used more than one definition of maximum load, but they are all small
variations on the concept expressed in the text. See infra notes 186-87 & accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 107-45 & accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 95-106 & accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 146-53 & accompanying text.
12. "Ignorance is the heart of the matter. [Pollution-control] planning is filled with
assumptions, guesswork, and oversimplifications because planners don't know nearly
enough about water and the way it responds to wasteloads." J. HOROWITZ & L. BAZEL, AN
ANALYSIS OF PLANNING FOR ADVANCED WASTEWATER TREATMENT 23 (1977) (also called
the VERTEX REPORT), partially reprinted in Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Review of the House
Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1214, 1248 (1978) [herein-
after cited as 1978 Hearings].
The VERTEX REPORT, which was prepared under contract for EPA and in cooperation
with several state pollution-control agencies, concluded that most maximum loads were
likely to be scientifically unsound. 1978 Hearings, supra, at 1215: H.R. REP. No. 1255, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978). See also California v. EPA, 689 F.2d 217, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(explaining the importance of the VERTEX REPORT).
13. See infra notes 186-94 & accompanying text.
14. "Section 301(b)(l)(C) requires that water quality standards shall be achieved not
later than July 1, 1977." ENVTL. POL'Y DIVISION OF THE CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE
LIBR. OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at 246 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
Congress also expected that all waters would be fit for fishing and swimming, wherever these
uses were attainable, by July 1, 1983. Clean Water Act § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(2)
(1976).
15. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 100-16 (1980):
Tyler, After S30 Billion No One Knows f Nation's Water Is An; Cleaner, Wash. Post. May
14, 1981, at Al, col. 1. See generally, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REP. No. CED-78-6: NA-
TIONAL WATER QUALITY GOALS CANNOT BE ATTAINED WITHOUT MORE ATTENTION TO
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this failure is the lack of carefully devised, scientifically sound cleanup
plans.16 Pollution-control agencies sometimes ignore the requirement
for maximum loads or do not properly comply with it. 17 In the last few
years a variety of plaintiffs have sued the pollution-control agencies to
compel them to develop proper maximum loads.18 The plaintiffs have
not obtained relief largely because the courts have found judicial re-
view inappropriate.
This Comment concludes that judicial review is both appropriate
and necessary. The Comment first traces the statutory history of WQS
and maximum loads and examines the congressional intent underlying
these requirements. It then analyzes four cases in which EPA was sued
in turn by an environmental group, an individual, a municipality, and
an industry; these cases show that pollution-control agencies have not
complied with the maximum-load requirements and that courts have
avoided their duty to enforce the Act. Finally, the Comment interprets
the meaning of maximum loads and provides specific suggestions for
judicial enforcement of the Act.
POLLUTION FROM DIFFUSED OR "NONPOINT" SOURCES (1977) [hereinafter cited as U.S.
GEN. AccT. OFF., REP. No. CED-78-61; U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., REP. No. CED-81-30: BET-
TER MONITORING TECHNIQUES ARE NEEDED TO ASSESS THE QUALITY OF RIVERS AND
STREAMS (1981).
16. As the authors of the VERTEX REPORT explained to Congress:
There must be a profound revulsion to wet feet, a distaste for long hours on the
open water, a dislike of careful scientific measurement. How else can one explain
the extreme reluctance of pollution-control agencies to study water? The talk of
water-quality improvement, aquatic ecology, non-degradation, and environmental
integrity is mostly talk. Little time or money is actually spent on learning how a
body of water behaves, how it responds to pollution, how it changes with the sea-
sons, how it is modified by resource development, how it responds to unusual
weather or hydraulic conditions. Suprisingly little is known about water quality or
the factors that influence it.
1978 Hearings, supra note 12, at 1233.
Inadequate sewage treatment is another reason for the persistence of pollution
problems:
While no comprehensive statistics are available, authoritative government
surveys of the completed [municipal sewage-treatment] plants show that at least 60
percent of them, and perhaps as much as 90 percent, don't perform up to anti-
pollution requirements more than half of the time.
Nearly a third of the federally funded plants have been designed, built or
operated so poorly that they are effectively out of commission much of the time.
Tyler, Cosd, Monuments to Idealism Now Lie Rusting in the Mud, Wash. Post, May 10, 1981,
at Al, col. 1.
17. See infra notes 92-153 & accompanying text.
18. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Scott v. City
of Hammond, 530 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Ill. 1981); DeKalb County v. EPA, Nos. 79-969A &
80-598A (N.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 1980); Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279
(D.S.D. 1979).
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History
The Water Quality Act of 1%5
Water-quality standards entered federal law in the Water Quality
Act of 196519 as the principal method of water-pollution control.
20
Under the 1965 Act, WQS consisted of three parts: designated uses,
water-quality criteria, and implementation plans.
2'
A designated use (such as recreation or fishing) describes how a
state wants to use a water segment.22 Water-quality criteria ensure that
the water is clean enough to support the designated use.23 Typical cri-
teria include specific requirements for dissolved oxygen (which fish
breathe), specific limits on fecal-coliform bacteria (sewage bacteria),
and general restrictions on unpleasant sights, smells, and tastes.
24 Im-
plementation plans describe how the pollution-control agencies intend
to bring waters into compliance with their WQS.
2 5
The 1965 Act left the states most of the power over pollution con-
trol. The appropriate federal agency26 could set WQS if the states re-
fused to, but it could not create an implementation plan.27 The federal
agency could also call conferences and establish hearing boards, but it
could not sue to enforce the WQS except as a last resort.28 The awk-
ward division of authority and cumbersome enforcement procedures
made the 1965 Act ineffective.29 Some states never set WQS; others did
not enforce the WQS they established.
30
Scientific difficulties inherent in the WQS process also contributed
to the ineffectiveness of the 1965 Act. Pollution problems are created
by complex interactions among weather, hydrology, ecology, and
19. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5, 79 Stat. 903, 907-09 (1965).
20. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202 (1976). The WQS
program was fortified with wastewater-treatment requirements and discharge permits issued
under authority found in the Refuse Act of 1899. Id. at 203. See Act of Mar. 3, 1899. ch.
425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1151, 1152 (1899) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976)).
21. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
1965 Act itself mentioned only water-quality criteria and implementation plans. Water
Quality Act of 1965 § 5(c)(1).
22. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 415-16 (1977).
23. See id.
24. EPA, QUALITY CRITERIA FOR WATER 6, 42, 123 (1976).
25. See W. RODGERS, supra note 22, at 415-16.
26. In 1965, the federal agency responsible for pollution control was the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare. Water Quality Act of 1965 § 1.
27. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd.. 426 U.S. 200, 202 n.4 (1976).
28. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, § 7.
75 Stat. 204, 207-09 (1961).
29. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976).
30. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 704, 1254.
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wastewater discharges.3' It is difficult to apportion the blame for a
problem among its causes, and even harder to predict how changes in
wastewater treatment will affect water quality.3 2 Consequently, the
states could not determine the particular causes of pollution problems
with sufficient precision to justify explicit implementation plans.
33
Congress' dissatisfaction with the 1965 Act led to the Clean Water
Act,34 which greatly increased federal power and established direct
control over wastewater discharges.
The Clean Water Act (1972)
The Clean Water Act embodies a dramatic change in philosophy:
In 1965 Congress believed that people had a right to discharge waste-
water unless it caused WQS violations,35 but in 1972 Congress believed
that no one should discharge any wastewater. This belief is reflected in
the unrealistic goals of the Clean Water Act. The stated objective of
the Act is to restore the nation's waters to their natural condition.
36
Another goal, which is often called "zero discharge," is to eliminate the
31. It is impossible to plan well without knowing in considerable detail what ails
the water. Inadequately treated wastewaters are unquestionably among the princi-
pal factors that affect water quality, but they are not the only factors, and they are
often far from the most important. Floods and droughts affect water quality. Se-
vere weather affects water quality. Land management affects water quality. Water
development affects water quality. The interaction among these factors is never
trivial, and it is foolish to think that wastewater management can be fairly evalu-
ated apart from detailed knowledge of these (and other) related factors.
1978 Hearings, supra note 12, at 1250.
32. "Causation, like truth itself, is never pure and rarely simple. Without knowing a
great deal about the causes of deficient water quality, one risks misidentifying them and
misallocating a fortune to mistaken causes." Id.
33. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HisToRY, supra note 14, at 704. "The enforcement plans under
the 1965 Act were typically vague directives to a particular source ... with the details of the
obligation a subject of barter between state officials and plant engineers." W. RODGERS,
supra note 22, at 417.
34. EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203 (1976).
35. The 1965 Act "focused on the tolerable effects rather than the preventable causes of
water pollution." Id. at 202.
36. "The objective of this Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(1976). The legislative history suggests that restoring the integrity of water means re-creat-
ing the water quality of several hundredyears ago:
The word "integrity" as used is intended to convey a concept that refers to a
condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems is maintained.
"[N]atural" is generally defined as that condition in existence before the
activities of man invoked the perturbations which prevented the system from re-
turning to its original state of equilibrium.
.. . Any change induced by man which overtaxes the ability of nature to
restore conditions to "natural" or "original" is an unacceptable perturbation.
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 763-64.
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discharge of pollutants. 37
Zero Discharge
The legislative history of the Clean Water Act shows that Congress
was divided over the issue of zero discharge.38 Proponents 39 of this
goal took it literally;40 they expected industries to recycle their waste-
water within each factory and municipalities to treat their sewage on
The "natural... integrity" of the waters may be determined partially by con-
sultation of historical records on species composition, partially from ecological
studies of the area or comparable habitats[,] partially from modeling studies which
make estimations of the balanced natural ecosystem based on the information
available.
Id. at 1468.
Taken literally, the integrity goal leads to absurd conclusions. Consider physical integ-
rity, for example, which apparently means that water should be free to flow in natural chan-
nels. But the natural channels have been extensively altered since colonial times to improve
the human environment. Cities have diverted riverflow for hundreds of miles to provide a
constant supply of drinking water. Cities have extended themselves by landfilling shallow
waters. In San Francisco, a plaque near Market and Battery Streets-almost a half mile
from the water-marks the original shoreline. Farmers have drained swamps to create rich
farms. Whole rivers have been moved and riverflows fully controlled by dams, levees, by-
passes, canals, and channel improvements; these engineering feats provide flood control and
a dependable supply of water for household use, agriculture, industry, navigation, recreation
and pollution control. INTREC, INC., AN ASSESSMENT OF PLANNING FOR WATER-POLLU-
TION CONTROL IN SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA ch. IV (1975).
If the integrity objective were to be taken at face value, all the nation's dams would
have to be destroyed, along with all the drinking-water pipelines, irrigation canals, and ship
channels; cities built on filled-in swamps would have to be dynamited and dug out, and
farms would have to be flooded to return them to swamps. At its logical extreme, the objec-
tive would prohibit running water in any home. Plainly, Congress did not intend these
consequences.
Although the historical chemistry and biology of the nation's waters is not documented
as well as the historical channels, enough is known to lead to similarly absurd conclusions.
It is known, for example, that many sport fish are not native to their environments; they
were artificially introduced by sportsmen and government agencies and proceeded to out-
compete the indigenous fish. Id. at IV-17 to IV-19 & IV-23 to IV-25. It is also known that
the swamps bred diseases, including malaria. Id. at IV-19 to IV-20. Congress probably did
not intend to re-establish the indigenous fish by poisoning whole rivers and starting afresh it
cannot have intended to re-create the historical populations of Plasmodium protozoa (the
causative agents of malaria) and anopheles mosquitoes (the carriers).
A more reasonable interpretation is that Congress meant integrity to mean desirable.
not natural, water quality. Purified drinking water, for example, is not natural but it is
clean. See generally NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 69-71
(1973).
37. Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
38. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 703-05.
39. Senator Muskie, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Committee on Public Works, was the principal author of the Act. E.I. du Pont v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 129 (1977); 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at iii, 703.
40. "The no discharge goal of 1985 ... leaves no doubt about what was meant." W.
RODGERS, supra note 22, at 419.
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land by using wastewater to irrigate crops.41 The proponents admitted
that zero discharge might not be feasible in 197242 but argued that by
setting the goal Congress could force the development of new technol-
ogy that would make it feasible.
43
Opponents in Congress44 and administrative agencies45 considered
zero discharge an unrealistic "false promise."'46 They argued that re-
moving the last one percent of a pollutant costs as much as removing
the first ninty-nine percent and produces few benefits.47 They asserted
that extreme treatment of wastewater exacerbates another environmen-
tal problem: where to dispose of the pollutants removed from waste-
water.48 Finally, they pointed out that the nation's waters would not be
clean even if all point sources were eliminated because there would still
be pollution from nonpoint sources.
49
Although the proponents succeeded in establishing zero discharge
as a goal of the Act, Congress did not require attainment of this goal,
and the EPA did not try to attain it.50 Municipalities were not forced to
build land-treatment projects: In 1977, the Senate found only one ma-
jor land-treatment project,51 and it had been planned before the 1972
Act.5 2 In 1976, the National Commission on Water Quality, which had
been created by the Clean Water Act to determine whether the congres-
41. See 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 705, 866.
42. Id. at 165, 1262.
43. See id. at 170, 701-05, 866, 1430. See also United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556
F.2d 822, 838 (7th Cir. 1977). A staff member of the Senate explained: "What we want is 14
years of [research and development] based on the assumption that closed-cycle [Le., re-
cycling] systems are the norm, not waste discharge." 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 14, at 704.
44. The House wanted to wait a few years before requiring best-available treatment or
zero discharge. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 354, 416, 430.
45. The opponents included William Ruckelshaus, the EPA Administrator, and Rus-
sell Train, Chairman of the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality and future EPA Ad-
ministrator. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 1116-17, 1186-89.
46. Id at 1187. "[Zero discharge's] chief failing is that it is considered incredible by
most of those charged with implementing the Act, and therefore is a source of derision
instead of inspiration." W. RODGERS, supra note 22, at 419.
47. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 705, 1116, 1147, 1262-63.
48. Id. at 413-15.
49. Id. at 354, 430. See infra note 59 for an explanation of point and nonpoint sources.
50. See Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976) (statutory wastewater-treat-
ment requirements); 40 C.F.R. §§ 125, 401-460 (1982) (regulatory wastewater-treatment
requirements).
51. S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977).
52. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 705. Congress has provided incen-
tives for land treatment by reserving four to seven and one-half percent of the federal con-
struction grants allocated to each state for innovative and alternative technology. Clean
Water Act § 205(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1285(i) (Supp. V 1981).
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sional assumptions were realistic, 53 flatly rejected zero discharge as be-
ing prohibitively expensive. 54 Even the proponents of zero discharge
never intended to require attainment of the goal if it proved too expen-
sive.55 They phrased the Act's wastewater-treatment requirements in
terms of "practicable" and "economically achievable." 56 Zero dis-
charge was an expression of Congress' hope that future technology
could eliminate the discharge of pollutants, but nothing in the Act actu-
ally required the attainment of zero discharge.
Congress has never tried to amend the goal. On the contrary, it
ritualistically repeats that the goal remains unchanged. 57 Yet the 1977
and 1981 amendments to the Clean Water Act reveal that Congress has
abandoned zero discharge by redefining it out of existence.58
Technology-Based Effluent Limits
Unlike the 1965 Act, the Clean Water Act directly attacks waste-
water dischargers. No point source 59 may discharge wastewater with-
out a permit. 60 To obtain permits, dischargers must use the "best
53. 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 354, 1042.
54. NAT'L COMM'N ON WATER QUALITY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 30 (1976). The
Commission defined zero discharge as "the removal of constituents which are added during
the use of the waters," that is, no "net addition" of pollutants. Id. Eliminating the dis-
charge of all pollutants would presumably be even more expensive.
55. "Reasonable cost is the basic test, under the [Senate] bill, for the elimination of
discharges." 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 1263.
56. Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).
57. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 204, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981); H.R. REP. No. 270, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1981 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2629-30.
58. See infra notes 73-91 & accompanying text.
59. The term "point source" means any discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance, including but not limited to any ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete
fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term
does not include return flows from irrigated agriculture.
Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
A "nonpoint source" is any source that is not a point source. Some dischargers do not
neatly fit in either category, and there has been some controversy over the classifications.
See Annot., 52 A.L.R. FED. 885 (1981); see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693
F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that EPA has authority to define point sources).
The authors of the Clean Water Act implicitly assumed that point sources cause most
pollution problems. The Act barely mentions nonpoint sources, and it applies the principal
pollution-control method-technology-based effluent limits--only to point sources. See
Clean Water Act §§ 208(b)(2)(F)-(K), 301(b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(b)(2)(F)-(K), 1311 (b) (1976
& Supp. V 1981). Since 1972, however, it has become clear that nonpoint sources cause
many problems. See supra note 15. Stormwater, for example, which washes dog excrement
off streets and agricultural chemicals off farms, is a nonpoint source. Dams, which convert
free-flowing rivers into reservoirs, also cause pollution problems. National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 161-64 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
60. Clean Water Act §§ 301(a), 402(a), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a) (1976). A dis-
charge permit specifies the wastewater-treatment requirements applicable to an individual
(Vol. 34
practicable" wastewater treatment after 1977 and the "best available"
treatment after 1983.61 These wastewater-treatment requirements are
often called "technology-based effluent limits," and they are defined
individually for each category of dischargers.
62
Congress gave EPA, which had been formed in 1970,63 the power
to define the technology-based effluent limits. Congress also gave EPA
control of the permit system: EPA determines whether states are quali-
fied to issue permits, it issues permits for those states that are not quali-
fied, and it can veto any permit.
64
Congress helped pay for the wastewater treatment and pollution-
control planning it required. The Act provided billions of dollars to
build municipal sewage-treatment plants and millions-more to subsi-
dize state and local pollution-control agencies. 65 EPA largely controls
the grant programs.66
Water-Quality Standards and Maximum Loads
The Clean Water Act modified the WQS requirements of the 1965
Act. WQS now consist of two parts: designated uses and water-quality
criteria. 67 Congress replaced the old requirement for implementation
plans with two new requirements. The states must identify all water
segments where best-practicable treatment cannot ensure compliance
with WQS.68 For these segments, the states must establish maximum
discharger; these requirements may be technology-based limits or limits derived from WQS
through maximum loads. See EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200,
204-05 (1976).
61. See supra note 5. Strictly speaking, the requirements for "best practicable" and
"best available" treatment apply to non-municipal discharges; the equivalent requirements
for municipal discharges are called "secondary" treatment and "best practicable waste treat-
ment technology." Clean Water Act §§ 301 (b)(l)-(2), 201 (g)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 (b)(l)-
(2), 1281(g)(2)(A) (1976). For convenience, this Comment uses "best practicable" treatment
to refer to the 1977 limits for both municipal and non-municipal discharges.
62. See Clean Water Act § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. §1311(b) (1976); 40 C.F.R. §§ 125, 401-
460 (1982). They are also called "technology based controls" and "technology based limita-
tions." Water Quality Standards Regulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,234, 49,244 (1982).
63. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970).
64. Clean Water Act § 402(b)-(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)-(d) (1976).
65. Id. §§ 106, 207, 208(0, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1287, 1288(0.
66. The states retain some authority; for example, they decide which projects receive
federal grants. Id. § 204(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1284(a)(3). However, EPA may refuse to pay for
certain projects. California v. EPA, 689 F.2d 217, 220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
67. Clean Water Act § 303(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1976).
68. Each State shall identify those waters within its boundaries for which the
[technology-based effluent limits] are not stringent enough to implement any water
quality standard applicable to such waters. The State shall establish a priority
ranking for such waters, taking into account the severity of the pollution and the
uses to be made of such waters.
Clean Water Act § 303(d)(l)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(l)(A) (1976).
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loads "to implement the applicable water quality standards." 69
Logic suggests that a state can establish maximum loads by devis-
ing a plan for ensuring WQS compliance. In a simple case, a state
might establish a maximum load by ascertaining that a point source is
causing WQS violations and by computing the degree of wastewater
treatment necessary to eliminate the violations.70 The state could then
order the discharger to comply with the computed degree of treatment.
In a more complicated case a state might consider other methods of
pollution control: diverting wastewater to another segment, increasing
riverflow, controlling nonpoint sources, and modifying dam opera-
tions.71 A state might also consider changing the WQS, especially if the
WQS cannot be attained under any circumstances. The Act sets no
69. Each State shall establish for the waters identified in paragraph (1)(A) of this
subsection, and in accordance with the priority ranking, the total maximum daily
load, for those pollutants which [EPA] identifies . . . as suitable for such calcula-
tion. Such load shall be established at a level necessary to implement the applica-
ble water quality standards with seasonal variations and a margin of safety which
takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between ef-
fluent limitations and water quality.
id. § 303(d)(l)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
Pollution-control agencies may not be able, as a practical matter, to provide a proper
margin of safety:
If total maximum daily loads had to be adjusted downwards to compensate
for "any lack of knowledge" in the "margin of safety," discharges would have to be
flatly forbidden in vast areas of the country. In four of our case studies. . . WQS
would be violated even if the cities were wiped off the map.
1978 Hearings, supra note 12, at 1248-49.
70. Even in a simple case, computing the degree of wastewater treatment necessary to
ensure compliance with WQS may be enormously difficult. See generall4' L. BAZEL, ABAT-
ING WATER POLLUTION IN THE SOUTH RIVER AND LAKE JACKSON, GEORGIA: AN EVALUA-
TION OF WATER QUALITY, MATHEMATICAL MODELING, AND THE POLLUTION-CONTROL
AGENCIES (1981). This Comment recommends specific rules for clarifying maximum loads
and ensuring their validity. See infra notes 186-94 & accompanying text.
71. Some of the most famous pollution-control successes resulted from methods other
than wastewater treatment.
The cleanup of Lake Washington (which is surrounded by Greater Seattle) involved
diverting sewage from the sensitive lake to robust Puget Sound. Edmonson, Eutrophication
in North America, in EUTROPHICATION: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, CORRECTIVES 124-49
(1969). After the diversion, Seattle's sewage was actually given less treatment than before,
because the extra treatment was considered unnecessary. id.
The cleanup of the Willamette River (which flows past Portland, Oregon) depended on
low-flow augmentation, which increases riverflow during droughts by releasing stored water
from reservoirs. D. RICKERT, W. HINES & S. MCKENSIE, METHODOLOGY FOR RIVER-
QUALITY ASSESSMENT WITH APPLICATION TO THE WILLAMETTE RIVER BASIN, OREGON
M12-13 (undated, c. 1976).
Recently, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that all dam owners must
use reservoir-management techniques, if necessary, to prevent dams from discharging pollu-
tants. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 693 F.2d 156
(D.C. Cir. 1982). Although this holding was overruled, the District of Columbia Circuit
concluded that states could regulate dam-caused pollution through "areawide" pollution-
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restrictions on how maximum loads may ensure compliance with
WQS.
Once again, Congress gave EPA control of the process. The states
must submit their proposed WQS and maximum loads to EPA, which
must disapprove any that are inappropriate and replace those disap-
proved with proper standards and loads.
72
The 1977, 1978, and 1981 Amendments
The Clean Water Act has been criticized as being wasteful and
ineffective. Critics claim that some pollution problems can be solved
without expensive treatment 73 and that nonpoint sources would prevent
even zero discharge from attaining clean water.74
By 1977, Congress realized that pollution control was more expen-
sive and time-consuming than expected. 75 It also realized that technol-
ogy-based effluent limits were not appropriate for all situtations: The
1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act 76 provided categorical ex-
ceptions to the technology-based effluent limits for some pollutants
77
and for some municipalities that discharge into an ocean.
78
In 1977, Congress began abandoning the zero-discharge philoso-
phy and allowing wastewater discharges that did not cause pollution
problems. The legislative history explains that Congress intended "to
avoid unnecessary or unreasonable investments in the control of dis-
control planning and that EPA could insist on stronger abatement measures. 693 F.2d at
179, 182-83.
72. Clean Water Act § 303(c)-(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)-(d)(2) (1976).
73. One example is municipal wastewater discharged into an ocean. S. REP. No. 95-
370, supra note 51, at 5; U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., REP. No. CED-81-68: BILLIONS COULD BE
SAVED THROUGH WAIVERS FOR COASTAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANTS at i (1981).
Another example is municipal wastewater discharged into large rivers. U.S. GEN. AcCT.
OFF., SECONDARY TREATMENT OF MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER IN THE ST. Louis AREA-
MINIMUM IMPACT EXPECTED at i (1978).
74. "If not controlled, nonpoint pollution will prevent attainment of national water
quality goals and will continue to grow in significance as 'point' sources of pollution... are
brought under control." U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., REP. No. CED-78-6, supra note 15, at i.
"In many areas nonpoint source pollution will prevent the attainment of the 'fisha-
ble/swimmable' goal established by the [Clean Water] Act." Wozniak, Nonpoint Source Pol-
lution and the Imposition of Ejfuent Limits on Point Sources, 8 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS,
TECH. & L. 117 (1980).
75. The $21 billion in federal grants to municipalities that were authorized in 1972
were supplemented with $26 billion in 1977. H.R. REP. No. 97-270, supra note 57, at 2.
Only about 50% of all municipalities met the 1977 deadlines. H.R. REP. No. 139, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977). However, about 90% of all non-municipal point sources met the
1977 deadlines. S. REP. No. 95-370, supra note 51, at 7.
76. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
77. Clean Water Act § 301(b)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
78. Id. 301(h), 33 U.S.C. 1311(h).
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charges for which there would be no water-quality benefit" and to pre-
vent "treatment for the sake of treatment. '79 Zero discharge, which
had once apparently meant no discharge of any substance at all, was
redefined to mean no discharge of substances in amounts sufficient to
cause pollution problems:
The 1972 act stipulated that the Nation's fresh and marine wa-
ters would not be an element of the waste treatment process. 80 That
continues to be national policy. For communities and industries, the
discharge of waste directly into the Nation's waters and oceans is per-
mitted only where fit] will not inter[fere] with the attainment or mainte-
nance of that water quality which assures the protection and
propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife, and allows recreational activities, in and on the water:
that is[,] only where ecological balance can be assured. 81
This definition eliminates the distinction between zero discharge and
the general clean-water goals in effect before 1972.82 Consequently,
zero discharge, as it is now defined, includes any wastewater discharge
that does not cause a pollution problem.
Congress continued to move away from zero discharge. A 1978
amendment to the Clean Water Act restricted federal grants for "ad-
vanced treatment," which is municipal-sewage treatment more strin-
gent than that required under the technology-based limits. 83 The 1981
amendments 84 expanded the ocean-discharge exceptions, 85 created new
exceptions for certain kinds of technology,86 and extended the compli-
ance deadline for some municipalities to 1988.87
In 1981, Congress abandoned zero discharge for municipal sew-
age-treatment plants by announcing a new policy preventing federal
79. S. REP. No. 95-370, supra note 51, at 43. This report was presented by Senator
Muskie, the leading proponent of zero discharge. See supra note 39.
80. Here the committee asserts that the Clean Water Act prohibits using the natural
purifying ability of waters to recycle pollutants. Many pollutants are naturally recycled in
water because they are used as food by aquatic organisms; owing to this phenomenon, wa-
ters are said to purify themselves. ENVIRONMENT: RESOURCES, POLLUTION & SoCIETY 216-
17 (W. Murdoch ed. 1971). The Senate committee contradicts its original assertion in the
second half of the quotation by concluding that national policy allows dischargers to use the
purifying ability of waters so long as no water-quality problems result.
81. S. REP. No. 95-370, supra note 51, at 4 (emphasis added).
82. Before 1972, the purpose of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was "to en-
hance the quality and value of our water resources and to establish a national policy for the
prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution." EPA v. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203 n.8 (1976).
83. California v. EPA, 689 F.2d 217, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
84. Municipal Wastewater Treatment Construction Grant Amendments of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-117, 95 Stat. 1623 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1981)).
85. Clean Water Act § 301(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h) (Supp. V 1981).
86. Id. § 304(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d).
87. Id. § 301(i), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(i). Congress also authorized two billion dollars per
year to build municipal sewage-treatment plants. Id. § 207, 33 U.S.C. § 1287.
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grants from being given to projects not "designed to achieve optimum
water quality management."'88 The optimum-management policy di-
rects federal money toward sewage-treatment plants that will produce
the greatest water-quality benefit at the least cost and away from ex-
pensive and inefficient advanced-treatment plants.
8 9
When Congress took zero discharge literally, there were fewer
questions about wastewater-treatment requirements; the more treat-
ment, the better. Now pollution-control agencies must weigh the costs
of advanced treatment against the benefits, which are hard to predict.90
States predict the benefits of advanced treatment by computing maxi-
mum loads.91
Courts Have Refused To Compel Maximum Loads
Because maximum loads are difficult to establish and because the
Clean Water Act sets hasty deadlines, 92 pollution-control agencies may
be tempted to cut comers, act arbitrarily, or ignore statutory require-
ments.93 In four federal-court cases,94 plaintiffs claimed that the states
had submitted either improper maximum loads or none at all, and that
EPA had failed to comply with its statutory duty to approve or disap-
prove them. Each court found different reasons to avoid ordering
compliance.
88. Id. § 216,33 U.S.C. § 1296. Congress also prohibited construction grants and area-
wide-planning grants from being given to states that do not review and revise WQS within
three years. Id. § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313. This severe penalty, which could cost billions of
dollars, signals the renewed importance of WQS.
89. Congressman Edgar, who wrote the provision, explained that "[clommon sense dic-
tates that limited funds should go to clean up dirty water." H. R. REP. No. 97-270, supra
note 57, at 26. The Senate passed a similar provision: "In order to achieve the primary goal
of the legislation-the greatest possible degree of pollution reduction for each Federal dollar
expended-[the Senate bill] requires the States ... to give priority to those projects achiev-
ing the most significant benefits in public health and water quality." S. REP. No. 97-204,
supra note 57, at 16.
90. See supra note 12. EPA has proposed new WQS regulations that encourage the
states to modify WQS where the benefits of attaining them do not justify the costs. Water
Quality Standards Regulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,234, at 49,247 (1982); EPA, DRAFT WATER
QUALITY STANDARDs HANDBOOK 4-5 (1982).
91. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 12, at 1230.
92. See Clean Water Act §§ 303-304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313-1314 (1976).
93. In plain words, the Act requires the Nation to plan like mad and build like
crazy. And that, we fear, is exactly what has happened. Planners and designers
have tried to make the best of an impossible schedule by hastily doing what they
can with inadequate data. In consequence, the planning documents are often less
ennobled by scientific truth and engineering excellence than by practical expedi-
ence, and the planning process is degraded into a bureaucratic exercise undertaken
in a race against the clock to comply with Federal requirements and to qualify for
Federal subsidies.
1978 Hearings, supra note 12, at 1260.
94. See supra note 18.
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Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA95 (1979)
Homestake Mining, a South Dakota industry, sued EPA to compel
disapproval of wastewater-treatment requirements that had been de-
rived from WQS.96 According to the logic of the Act, the state pollu-
tion-control agency should first have set WQS, then determined
maximum loads, then enforced the maximum loads through treatment
requirements. 97 South Dakota skipped the middle step: It set Home-
stake's treatment requirements without formally determining maxi-
mum loads.98 The court, however, avoided requiring maximum loads
(and invalidating the treatment requirements) by strictly interpreting
the statutory deadlines.
The Act required EPA to identify, by October 1973, the pollutants
for which maximum loads can be determined. 99 The states were re-
quired to submit maximum loads to EPA within 180 days after this
identification list was published.'00 EPA did not publish the list until
December 1978, more than five years after it was due. I°  Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the states were not required to submit
maximum loads until 180 days after EPA actually published the list
(ie., June 1979), which was well after South Dakota had set Home-
stake's treatment requirements. 1
02
The court's reasoning is not convincing because EPA's failure to
publish the list was inconsequential. Through its regulations, EPA had
been requiring the states to submit maximum loads long before the list
was published.'0 3 In fact, EPA asserted that the list was unnecessary
because its regulations were accomplishing what the Act intended.'0
4
There is no evidence that South Dakota or any other state objected to
the absence of a list. When the list was finally published, it included all
95. 477 F. Supp. 1279 (D.S.D. 1979).
96. Id. at 1282. Homestake also challenged the WQS themselves. It claimed that the
Clean Water Act requires the states to consider the economic effects of WQS before setting
them, that South Dakota did not, and therefore that EPA should have rejected them. Id.
This argument goes too far. Although the Clean Water Act allows EPA to disapprove WQS
because a state did not consider economic effects, it does not require EPA to disapprove
them. Note that EPA now encourages states to consider the economic effects of WQS before
setting them. Water Quality Standards Regulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,234, at 49,247 (1982).
97. Clean Water Act § 303(c)-(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)-(d) (1976).
98. Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. at 1287-88.
99. Clean Water Act § 304(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2) (1976).
100. Id. § 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
101. Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,662 (1978).
102. Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. at 1288.
103. Proposed Identification of Pollutants for Calculation of Total Maximum Daily




pollutants 0 5 and consequently did not constrain any determination of
maximum loads. In order to derive Homestake's treatment require-
ments from WQS, South Dakota must have done some sort of compu-
tation; in other words, it must have prepared an informal maximum
load.'0 6 By strictly interpreting the 180-day deadline, the court allowed
South Dakota to establish informal maximum loads without making its
computations open to public scrutiny.
Even by the court's own reasoning, maximum loads were due in
June 1979 - four months before the opinion was published. The court
should at least have noted that South Dakota was required to comply
with that deadline.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle 07 (1981)
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), an environmentalist
group, sued EPA108 to compel it to disapprove the existing Colorado
River WQS, establish new WQS, and determine maximum loads. The
District of Columbia Circuit found the existing WQS adequate' 0 9 and
refused to require maximum loads."10
The court gave three reasons for not ordering EPA to determine
maximum loads. First, it adopted the reasoning of Homestake Mining
and found that maximum loads were due in June 1979.111 Because
EDF had moved for summary judgment before June 1979, the motion
was premature."1
2
Second, the District of Columbia Circuit found that a court would
have to review the "priority ranking" before ordering maximum
loads.' 13 A priority ranking lists water segments in the order in which
the state wants to clean them up.1 4 The Clean Water Act specifies that
maximum loads shall be determined "in accordance with the priority
ranking,"' 15 but the meaning of the phrase is not clear.
The District of Columbia Circuit's finding implies that a court
cannot compel a state to determine maximum loads for a segment un-
105. "All pollutants, under the proper technical conditions, are suitable." Total Maxi-
mum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,662, at 60,665 (1978).
106. Although the court mentions that Homestake's wastewater-treatment requirements
were derived from WQS, it did not discuss how the requirements were derived or whether
they were justified. Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. at 1282.
107. 657 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
108. Douglas Costle was the Administrator of EPA. Id at 275.
109. Id at 287-88.
110. Id. at 294-95.
111. Id. at 295.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Clean Water Act § 303(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (1976).
115. Id. § 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
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less the state has reached that segment in the priority ranking. This
interpretation would transform the mandatory maximum-load require-
ments of the Act into discretionary ones. The Act requires states to
establish maximum loads for "those waters"-not some of those wa-
ters-that will violate WQS after all dischargers use the best-practica-
ble treatment."16 These loads must be submitted to EPA within 180
days after EPA publishes the list of suitable pollutants." 1
7
Moreover, Congress must have intended that these planning re-
quirements would be met well before 1977, because Congress specified
that all point sources must install whatever wastewater treatment is "re-
quired to implement any applicable water quality standard" by July
1977.118 Planning must be complete before a wastewater-treatment
plant is designed and built.
There is another interpretation of the phrase "in accordance with
the priority ranking" that conforms with both congressional intent and
the specific language of the Act: The states must follow the priority
ranking before the 180-day deadline.' 9 Congress apparently wanted
the states to work quickly and to work on the dirtiest or most important
waters first. The hasty deadlines common throughout the Act reflect an
impatience with the pollution-control agencies. However, Congress
was unreasonable in expecting the states to determine all maximum
loads within 180 days. The states are still determining maximum loads
more than a decade later.'
20
The District of Columbia Circuit's third reason for not ordering
maximum loads was that nonpoint sources cause most of the pollution
problems in the Colorado River.' 2' The court must have believed that
maximum loads affect only point sources, but nothing in the Act re-
stricts maximum loads to point sources.' 22 Without accounting for
nonpoint-source pollution, maximum loads cannot fulfill their function
116. Id. § 303(d)(1)(A)-(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A)-(C).
117. Id. § 303(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
118. Id. § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1)(C).
119. The Act requires states to submit maximum loads "from time to time, with the first
such submission not later than one hundred and eighty days after the date of publication of
the first identification" of suitable pollutants. Id. § 303(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). The
"from time to time" phrase is also found among the requirements for WQS, which must be
reviewed, revised, and submitted to EPA "from time to time" but at least every three years.
Id. § 303(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1). Congress apparently repeated the phrase to ensure
that when the states revised their WQS and consequently had to establish revised maximum
loads, these revised maximum loads would also be submitted to EPA.
120. Watdr Quality Planning and Management, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,668 (1982).
121. Less than two percent of the salt in the Colorado River comes from point sources.
Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 195.
122. There is ambiguous language in an earlier District of Columbia Circuit opinion
suggesting that § 303(e), which incorporates the maximum loads required by § 303(d), "lim-
its State efforts" to point sources. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle. 564 F.2d
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of ensuring compliance with WQS.123
None of the three reasons justified the court's refusal to compel
maximum loads, especially since the opinion was published in April
1981, twenty-two months after the June 1979 deadline.
DeKalb County v. EPA124 (1980)
DeKalb County sued EPA and the Georgia pollution-control
agency to compel proper WQS and maximum loads.125 The county
alleged that 1) Georgia had prepared improper maximum loads that
would result both in WQS violations and in unnecessarily expensive
wastewater-treatment requirements, and that 2) EPA had failed to re-
view the maximum loads and disapprove them.
2 6
The federal district court dismissed the suit because the Clean
Water Act reserves certain powers to the states, including the power to
set wastewater-treatment requirements that are more costly than the
573, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1977). However, this suggestion is contrary to the language and logical
structure of the Act.
It is true that the Clean Water Act does not force the states to control all nonpoint
sources. See id. at 580; Clean Water Act § 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1976). Congress did not
want to interfere with state water management any more than necessary. National Wildlife
Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See Clean Water Act § 101(g),
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (Supp. V 1981)'
Nevertheless, Congress did intend to require the states to implement the WQS they
established. The Act expressly requires that maximum loads "shall be established at a level
necessary to implement the applicable water quality standards." Clean Water Act
§ 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1976). Section 303(e) requires that the EPA Ad-
ministrator "shall approve any continuing planning process submitted to him under this
section which will result in plans for all navigable waters within such State, which include
.. . adequate implementation, including schedules of compliance, for revised or new water
quality standards." Id. § 303(e)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3). EPA regulations declare that
"[t]he water quality goals for navigable waters are. .. [aichievement of water quality stan-
dards." 40 C.F.R. § 35.1505 (1982). Nothing in the Act, the legislative history, or EPA
regulations says that maximum loads are not intended to apply to nonpoint sources.
This federal requirement to implement WQS does not inherently conflict with state
conflict with state control of nonpoint sources. If a state finds that nonpoint sources prevent
it from implementing WQS, or if the cost would be too great, the state may change the
WQS. .d. § 35.1550(c). But once a state decides on WQS, it must do what is necessary to
implement them.
123. U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., REP. No. CED-78-6, supra note 15, at i; STAFF OF THE
NAT'L COMM'N ON WATER QUALITY, STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
WATER QUALITY at IV-29 (1976). EPA has been aware of the importance of nonpoint
sources at least since 1974, when it estimated that the technology-based effluent limits could
not bring more than half of the 3100 segments identified nationwide into compliance with
their WQS. W. RODGERS, supra note 22, at 421 (citing EPA, Water Quality Strategy Paper
17 (Mar. 15, 1974)).
124. Nos. 79-969A & 80-598A (N.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 1980).
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federal technology-based requirements.127 The court found that the re-
served powers were "controlling" and that maximum loads were "sim-
ply inapplicable" to this case.' 2 8 It concluded that maximum loads
come into play only if the technology-based limits and the extra state
requirements are not sufficient to ensure WQS compliance.
129
This conclusion misinterprets the purpose of maximum loads.
Congress intended maximum loads to encourage rational planning, not
as a last-ditch attempt to clean up impossibly dirty waters.130 The stat-
utory scheme is explicit and logical. The states must divide their waters
into two categories: those in which best-practicable treatment can en-
sure WQS compliance, and those in which it cannot. 13' The states
must "estimate" the maximum loads for waters in the first category. 
32
The apparent purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the states
have correctly categorized the segments. The states must "establish"
maximum loads for waters in the second category. 133 These loads de-
scribe how to attain WQS compliance. 134 Because Congress required
some form of maximum loads for all waters, the court's finding that
they pertain only to extreme circumstances is plainly wrong.
The reserved state powers should be considered in perspective.
127. Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976).
128. DeKalb County v. EPA, slip op. at 2, 6 (Nov. 25, 1980).
129. Id. at 6. Even under this interpretation the court should not have dismissed the
case, because the county did allege that neither the technology-based limits nor the state-
imposed requirements could ensure compliance with WQS. See DeKalb County v. EPA,
slip op. at 2-3, 6-7 (Feb. 28, 1980) (acknowledging DeKalb's allegation of WQS violations).
The court forgot this allegation; it dismissed the claim precisely because DeKalb County
had "not even alleged" that there would be future WQS violations. See DeKalb County v.
EPA, slip op. at 6 (Nov. 25, 1980).
130. There is evidence in both the statute and legislative history to support the idea that
Congress intended maximum loads to encourage rational planning, not just as a method for
forcing tighter effluent limits. Some maximum loads are required simply "[f]or the specific
purpose of developing information." Clean Water Act § 303(d)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(3)
(1976). The legislative history shows that WQS were controversial and that the House mem-
bers who insisted on WQS would not have fought merely to provide a method of tightening
effluent limits, because the Senate bill had a provision to accomplish just that. 1972 LEGIS-
LATIvE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 304-05, 416-17, 1610. This provision, entitled "Water
Quality Related Effluent Limitations," gives EPA authority to tighten the wastewater-treat-
ment requirements of any point source that "would interfere" with clean water. Clean
Water Act § 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976). More likely, Congress kept WQS and created
maximum loads because it was persuaded by the vehement opponents of zero discharge,
who felt that "the Senate may have sacrificed wisdom for simplicity" and that "the renuncia-
tion of known complexity on the altar of simplicity is the essence of bad government policy."
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 14, at 1188 (statement of William Ruckelshaus, EPA
Administrator).
131. Clean Water Act § 303(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(l)(A) (1976).
132. Id. § 303(d)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(3).
133. Id. § 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
134. Maximum loads "shall be established at a level necessary to implement the applica-
ble water quality standards." Id.
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Although the Act declares that "[ult is the policy of the Congress to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights
of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,"'135 the purpose of
the Act is to preempt much of the water-pollution-control field, not to
convey authority to the states. 136 Congress put all important functions
under federal control: power to set technology-based limits, 137 power
to issue discharge permits,' 38 power to sue dischargers and collect up to
$50,000 per day in fines, 139 and power over WQS, maximum loads, and
pollution-control planning. 40
Congress gave EPA carrots as well as sticks: billions of dollars for
municipal sewage-treatment plants and millions more for grants to
state agencies and to areawide-planning agencies. 41 Although the
states are allowed to participate in the planning and even to manage
the discharge-permit program, EPA retains the right to disapprove
state plans, veto any permit, and resume control of the permit
program. 1
42
True, the Act specifically allows the states to set wastewater-treat-
ment requirements stricter than the federal technology-based require-
ments. 143 When Congress interpreted zero discharge literally and
expected the technology-based limits to approach zero discharge, grant-
ing the states the power to push dischargers toward the goal was a small
concession. Now that Congress supports optimum management and
opposes wastewater treatment that is inefficient or does little to improve
water quality, Congress may intend that the states conform.
A recent case supports this hypothesis and diminishes the reserved
state power. In California v. EPA,"144 the District of Columbia Circuit
held that EPA can refuse to give federal grants to projects in which the
states have required wastewater treatment beyond the federal technol-
ogy-based effluent limits. 145 In short, the reserved state power cannot
justify the DeKalb court's dismissal of the suit.
135. Id. § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976).
136. "Congress' intent in enacting the [Clean Water Act] was clearly to establish an all-
encompassing program of water pollution regulation." City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304, 318 (1981).
137. Clean Water Act §§ 304(b)-(d), 306, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)-(d), 1316 (1976).
138. Id. § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
139. Id. § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
140. Id. § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
141. Id. §§ 106, 207, 208(f), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1287, 1288(f).
142. Id. § 402(c)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3).
143. Id. § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
144. 689 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
145. Id. at 221.
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Scott v. City of Hammond 146 (1981)
William Scott, an individual claiming to represent a class, 14 7 sued
to compel EPA to determine maximum loads for viruses and fecal-
coliform bacteria in Lake Michigan near Chicago. 148 The district court
held that EPA cannot force a state to submit maximum loads and, so
long as the state does not submit them, EPA has no power to approve
or disapprove them. 149 The court derived this conclusion from the fol-
lowing facts: 1) the Act does not specify what should be done if a state
agency fails to submit maximum loads, and 2) the statutory section au-
thorizing lawsuits to enforce various requirements does not mention
WQS or maximum loads.' 50
The court's conclusion is farfetched. Considering how much
power the Clean Water Act gives EPA, it is improbable that Congress
intended to leave EPA powerless when a state fails to submit maximum
loads. The Act explicitly requires EPA to establish maximum loads
when a state submits improper loads, 15 1 and it explicitly requires EPA
to set WQS when a state fails to submit WQS. 152 Most likely, Congress
also intended EPA to establish maximum loads when the state fails to
submit them. This interpretation explains why EPA has no authority
to sue states that do not submit maximum loads: EPA can establish
maximum loads on its own authority.
So far, four courts have been asked to compel EPA to establish
maximum loads, and all have refused. The reasons they gave-the
need to review priority rankings, the unimportance of point sources, the
146. 530 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
147. Id. at 288 n.l.
148. Scott also sued to force EPA to compel Illinois to set WQS for viruses. The district
court, relying on U. S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977), dismissed this
claim because it was not pleaded precisely. In U.S. Steel, the Seventh Circuit upheld a
district court's refusal to hear a WQS challenge that was not pleaded precisely. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that a district court has the authority to hear a WQS challenge against
EPA under the Administrative Procedure Act, and against a state agency for deprivation of
Constitutional rights, but not against EPA for deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. at
837. The Hammond court dismissed Scott's claim because he did not mention the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA). Scott v. City of Hammond, 530 F. Supp. at 289-90.
This decision misreads U.S. Steel, which does not require that the APA must be men-
tioned to state a claim, and which specifically notes that the APA does not provide jurisdic-
tion. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d at 837 n.18. Scott challenged EPA's approval of
the state-submitted WQS; he claimed that EPA did not act in accordance with the Clean
Water Act. Scott v. City of Hammond, 530 F. Supp. at 288. U.S. Steel specifically held that
the district court did have authority to review EPA's approval of the state-submitted water-
quality standards as consistent with the Clean Water Act. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train. 556
F.2d at 837.
149. Scott v. Hammond, 530 F. Supp. at 290.
150. Id.
151. Clean Water Act § 303(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (1976).
152. Id. § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c).
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reserved state power, and EPA's powerlessness to compel submis-
sions-cannot justify the refusal. The 180-day deadline is now long
past, no matter how it is calculated, and all maximum loads should be
due.153 Consequently, courts should compel the establishment of
proper maximum loads whenever the states submit improper loads or
none at all.
Judicial Enforcement of the Statutory Requirements
Courts have a statutory duty under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA)154 to enforce both the procedural and substantive require-
ments of the Clean Water Act. The APA requires a reviewing court to
"compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed."' 155 This standard applies to cases in which EPA has neither
approved nor disapproved WQS or maximum loads.
156
The APA also requires a reviewing court to "hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be. . . arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."'157 This standard applies to cases in which EPA has improp-
erly approved or disapproved WQS or maximum loads.158
Administrative agencies are entitled to deference, and EPA has en-
joyed great deference from the courts.' 59 An agency act is presumed
proper 60 and a court cannot simply substitute its judgment for an
agency's.' 6 ' Nevertheless, a court may not rubber stamp an agency de-
153. See spra note 119.
154. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-
559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1976)).
155. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(l) (1976).
156. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 283.
157. Administrative Procedure Act § l0(e)(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
158. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 283.
159. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 166-67 (D.C. Cir. 1982). EPA
receives deference not only for factual issues where it has scientific and technical expertise,
but also for interpretations of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 166-71. However, EPA's interpre-
tation of the Act is not entitled to deference if it contradicts the language of the statute or
frustrates congressional policy. See id. at 171.
Because of these rules, courts should not defer to EPA's interpretations of the statutory
requirements for maximum loads. EPA's interpretations contradict the language of the Act
and frustrate congressional policy. The maximum-load requirements are nondiscretionary
and nondelegatory duties. Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1976). Congress
clearly intended that maximum loads would implement the applicable WQS. Id. Congress
still intends to implement WQS; the 1981 amendments authorized federal expenditures spe-
cifically for pollution-control planning that would "meet and maintain" WQS. Id. § 201(g),
33 U.S.C. § 1281(g) (Supp. V 1981).
160. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 283.
161. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416.
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cision. 162 Its inquiry into the facts must be searching and careful, 63
especially in a highly technical case.164 In short, an agency must pres-
ent a reasonable justification for its acts, but it need not show that it
made the best choice.
The Procedural Requirements
The procedural requirements of the Clean Water Act are relatively
straightforward. By June 1979 each state should have submitted the
following to EPA: 1) a list of the segments in which best-practicable
treatment cannot ensure compliance with WQS, and 2) the maximum
load or loads established for each segment on the list.165 Consequently,
any state that has not submitted the list and the maximum loads has
unlawfully failed to comply with the Act.
The Act requires EPA either to approve or disapprove the submis-
sion within thirty days. 66 It also requires EPA to produce a proper
replacement, within another thirty days, for any item disapproved.
67
Consequently, EPA has unlawfully failed to act if it neither approved
nor disapproved the submissions by July 1979, or if it did not produce
proper replacements for the disapproved items by August 1979.
The Act requires the states to review and revise their WQS at least
once every three years, and to submit the revisions to EPA. 168 EPA
must either accept them within sixty days, or within ninety days reject
them and specify the changes that would make them acceptable.'
69
162. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 283; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
163. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 415-16: Environmental
Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 283.
164. Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d at 283 n.29.
165. Each State shall submit to the [EPA] Administrator from time to time, with
the first such submission not later than one hundred and eighty days after the date
of publication of the first identification of pollutants . . . for his approval the wa-
ters identified and the loads established under paragraphs (1)(A), (1)(B), (1)(C),
and (l)(D) of this subsection. The Administrator shall either approve or disap-
prove such identification and load not later than thirty days after the date of sub-
mission. If the Administrator approves such identification and load, such State
shall incorporate them into its current plan under subsection (e) of this section. If
the Administrator disapproves such identification and load, he shall not later than
thirty days after the date of such disapproval identify such waters in such State and
establish such loads for such waters as he determines necessary to implement the
water quality standards applicable to such waters and upon such identification and
establishment the State shall incorporate them into its current plan under subsec-
tion (e) of this section.
Clean Water Act § 303(d)(2), 33 US.C. § 1313(d)(2) (1976).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c).
169. Id.
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The state then has another ninety. days to make the changes; if it does
not, EPA must make them for the state.
70
Whenever a state revises the WQS for any segment, it must deter-
mine whether best-practicable treatment will ensure WQS compliance
in that segment; if not, it must establish the maximum load. 17' From
time to time, the states must submit these revisions to EPA, and EPA
must either approve or disapprove them within 30 days and replace any
item disapproved within another thirty days.172 Consequently, when-
ever EPA or any of the states does not follow these procedures, it has
unlawfully failed to comply with the Act.
The Substantive Requirements
Even if the pollution-control agencies follow the statutory proce-
dures, their actions may still be arbitrary and therefore unlawful. The
Clean Water Act expressly requires maximum loads forpollutants, but
the meaning of this requirement depends on the definitions of these
words. To determine whether an agency has substantively complied
with the maximum-load requirements, a court must understand what
pollutants and maximum loads are.
The Nature of Pollution
The Act defines pollutant by listing a curious hodgepodge of sub-
stances: "dredged spoil, solid waste, munitions, chemical wastes, bio-
logical materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded
equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt[,] and industrial, municipal, and agri-
cultural waste." 173 Another part of the Act uses the jargon of the pollu-
tion-control profession: suspended solids, fecal coliforms, and
"biological oxygen demanding" substances.
174
The list of possible pollutants does not end there. EPA has identi-
170. Id.
171. This requirement is not made explicit in the Act, but it follows logically from
§ 303(d) and (e), which requires states periodically to submit maximum loads to EPA. See
id. § 303(d)-(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)-(e).
172. Id. § 303(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
173. Id. § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The Act also definespollution as the "man-made
or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, or radiological integrity of
water." Id. § 502(19), 33 U.S.C. 1362(19). This definition should not be taken at face value.
See supra note 36.
174. Clean Water Act § 304(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Bio-
chemical oxygen demand (BOD) is a laboratory test for measuring how much dissolved
oxygen is consumed by decomposing organic substances; the phrase is also used to describe
the organic substances themselves. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS'N, AM. WATER WORKS ASS'N &
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FED'N, STANDARD METHODS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF
WATER AND WASTEWATER 483 (15th ed. 1980) (hereinafter cited as STANDARD METHODS].
Suspended solids are particles greater than a certain size; these particles may be organic
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fled dozens of substances that violate WQS. 7 .5 In dictum, the District of
Columbia Circuit has suggested that pollutants include not only sub-
stances in wastewater but also characteristics of water (viz., tempera-
ture) and the absence of substances (viz., dissolved oxygen). 76 The
court recognized that pollution problems can be caused by too much
heat or too much cold, too much dissolved air or too little dissolved
oxygen. 17
7
The idea that too little of something can be as detrimental as too
much is consistent with ecological concepts and is sometimes called
"balance."' 178 Just as people must have enough water so that they do
not die of thirst but not so much that they drown, a healthy ecosystem
needs an appropriate balance of substances and characteristics.
179
Anything can be a pollutant in certain circumstances, and many
things that are nominally pollutants can be beneficial. Dissolved min-
eral salts, for example, enrich bottled mineral water but degrade the
Colorado River. 8 0 Chlorine, a potent toxin, benefits humans in back-
yard swimming pools by killing microbes, but it endangers fish in riv-
ers. 18 Even treated sewage, in moderate quantities, can be beneficial
to aquatic life.'8 2 In contrast, clean freshwater is not nominally a pol-
sewage or mud. See id. at 90, 94-95. Fecal coliforms are a group of bacteria considered
indicative of recent fecal contamination. EPA, supra note 24, at 42-44.
The D.C. Circuit claims that BOD, suspended solids, fecal coliforms, and pH (a meas-
ure of acidity or alkalinity) are not pollutants, but "parameters" for measuring pollution.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174 n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1982). This distinc-
tion is not helpful. BOD and suspended solids, for example, are the names of certain kinds
of municipal waste. See STANDARD METHODS, supra. at 94-95, 483. In reality, EPA does
not regulate anything so vague as "municipal waste"; it regulates BOD, suspended solids,
pH, and formerly fecal coliforms. 40 C.F.R. § 133 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 133 (1975). Using the
acronym "BOD" rather than "decomposing organic compounds" is like using the phrase
"the Clean Water Act" rather than "federal water-pollution-control law."
175. See generally EPA, supra note 24.
176. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
177. Id. at 161-64.
178. E. ODUM, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 33-36 (3d ed. 1971).
179. See id. at 110-11.
180. For the lower main stem of the Colorado River, the water-quality criteria for salin-
ity range from 723 milligrams per liter (mg/i) to 879 mg/i. Environmental Defense Fund v.
Costle, 657 F.2d at 281 n.24. Many commercially available mineral waters are nearly this
salty; for example, Perrier contains 505 mg/l of mineral salts, and Calistoga contains 583
mg/l (according to their labels). Some are much saltier: Peters Val contains 2,000 mg/l, and
Calso contains 2,950 mg/l (according to their labels). Bottled mineral waters are not con-
sidered polluted, but dissolved salts are a serious problem in the Colorado River. Id. at 280.
The terms dissolved solids and salinity are equivalent for most purposes. EPA, supra note 24,
at 205.
181. See AM. WATER WORKS ASS'N, WATER QUALITY AND TREATMENT 158-59 (3d ed.
1971); EPA, supra note 24, at 33-35.
182. "Degradable pollutants that provide energy (organic matter) or nutrients
(phosphates, carbonates, etc.) will increase the productivity of the ecosystem . . . when the
rate of input is moderate . . . Additional input above [a critical level] becomes a stress,
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lutant but it is toxic to marine organisms adapted only to saltwater.
8 3
In short, the idea that all pollutants are inherently and invariably
harmful to the environment is simplistic and untrue.
Since anything can be a pollutant, and since EPA has concluded
that maximum loads may be determined for any pollutant, 8 4 must a
state determine maximum loads for the hundreds of possible pollutants
whenever there is a WQS violation? Plainly not. For the purpose of
determining maximum loads, 85 there is only one reasonable definition
of pollutant: A pollutant is anything that causes a WQS violation.
Consequently, states should determine maximum loads for whatever
substances or characteristics cause a segment to violate its WQS.
Proposed Rules for Maximum Loads
The Clean Water Act does not define maximum load, and EPA
tends to use intricate definitions that obscure the meaning of the
phrase. In 1978, for example, EPA defined a maximum load as "the
pollutant loading for a segment of water that results in an ambient con-
.centration equal to the numerical concentration limit required for that
pollutant by the numerical or narrative criteria in the water quality
standards."' 186 In 1982 EPA defined the phrase as "the total loadings of
pollutants and natural background for a receiving water which will
meet all applicable water quality standards."'
87
These definitions are too restrictive because they suggest that a
maximum load is a number. Congress could hardly have intended the
states to submit a number (e.g., 60,662.3 pounds per day) as a maxi-
mum load; a number has no meaning out of context.
Even in context, no single number can adequately describe a maxi-
and the system essentially becomes poisoned by 'too much of a good thing.'" E. ODUM,
supra note 178, at 434-35.
183. For example, in Hillsborough Bay (which borders Tampa, Florida) freshwater
killed massive amounts of saltwater algae, which accumulated onshore, rotted, and stank. J.
HOROWITZ & L. BAZEL, supra note 12, at 112-17.
184. Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,662 (1978).
185. The D.C. Circuit has concluded that the term pollutant can be construed broadly in
some circumstances and narrowly in others. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d
156, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Congress has also recognized that a substance can be a pollutant
in some circumstances and not in others. Id at 174 (quoting 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 14, at 1347).
In National Wildlife Fed'n, the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA's assertion that, for the pur-
pose of regulating dams as point sources, low dissolved-oxygen concentrations and cold tem-
peratures were not pollutants. Id. at 183. However, the court concluded that these and
other water conditions could be pollutants for other purposes. Id. at 174 n.56. Because the
purpose of maximum loads is to implement the applicable WQS, a maximum load must
account for everything that causes WQS violations.
186. Total Maximum Daily Loads Under Clean Water Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,662 (1978).
187. Water Quality Planning and Management, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,668, at 46,671 (1982).
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mum load. The ability of a segment to assimilate pollution depends on
many things, including the amount of water in the segment, the
weather, the location of the dischargers and their proportionate shares
of the total load, and a variety of physical, chemical, and biological
reactions.' 88 Whenever any of these conditions changes, so does the
maximum load - as EPA defines it. 189 Since water is as mercurial as
weather, the maximum load changes hourly. 190
Congress must have intended maximum loads to be comprehen-
sive cleanup plans, not numbers. After all, maximum loads replaced
the implementation plans required by the 1965 Act. 191 The WQS pro-
cess logically depends on a cleanup plan for each segment violating its
WQS. No other part of the Act provides for these individual cleanup
plans. 192
EPA has not regulated the content of maximum loads, and courts
trying to ascertain whether EPA has acted arbitrarily may need guide-
lines. This Comment proposes that a proper maximum load should
include the following:
1. A clear statement of the pollution problem, including an identi-
fication of the water-quality standards violated and the circumstances
and frequency of the violations.
2. An assessment of the reliability of the evidence (that is, the
water-quality data) describing the WQS violations.
3. An analysis of the possible causes of the WQS violations.
4. An evaluation of the possible solutions, including an estimate of
188. See supra note 31.
189. The maximum load changes regardless of which definition EPA uses.
190. To obtain a single maximum-load number, states must make assumptions about
riverflow, temperature, and everything else that affects the ability of water to assimilate pol-
lution. The assumptions are usually fed into a computer; this process hides the critical deci-
sions. See generally L. BAZEL, supra note 70.
Some of these assumptions have become standard, e.g., the "7Q10" drought, which is
the lowest seven-day riverflow statistically likely to recur once in ten years. See, e.g., Mis-
sissippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1273 (5th Cir. 1980). As a
consequence of this standardization, much of the planning is for abnormal conditions.
The Fifth Circuit incorrectly concluded that the 7QI0 "actually occurs for significant
periods virtually every year." Id. The Fifth Circuit assumed that riverflow is like roulette,
that one day of drought now and then is much more likely than seven days in a row. Actu-
ally, riverflow is very dependent on the riverflow of the day before- a day of droughtflow
cannot follow a day of flooding. Extreme droughts tend to last more than a week, so the
7Q10 may actually return for four or five weeks every forty or fifty years.
191. The statutory section covering WQS and maximum loads is entitled "Water Quali-
ty Standards and Implementation Plans." Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976).
192. Section 303(e) requires a continuing planning process and a statewide plan contain-
ing, among many other things, the maximum loads determined under § 303(d). 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)-(e) (1976). However, the apparent purpose of § 303(e) is to gather and coordinate
the many plans and determinations required by the Act, whereas the apparent purpose of
§ 303(d) is to produce cleanup plans for individual segments.
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the likelihood of success of each and an explicit determination of
whether the WQS are attainable.
193
5. A choice among the possibilities and an explanation of the rea-
sons justifying the choice.
6. A plan for ascertaining the success or failure of the choice and
for modifying it as appropriate.'
94
When a maximum load lacks any of these elements, or when any
of them is not substantially justified by the record, the agencies must
have acted arbitrarily.
Conclusion
Federal district courts should accept cases involving water-quality
standards and maximum loads. They should enforce the express provi-
sions of the Clean Water Act requiring states to submit maximum loads
to EPA and requiring EPA to disapprove inappropriate submissions
and establish proper maximum loads. The courts should interpret a
maximum load to be a comprehensive cleanup plan that must include a
thoughtful and searching analysis of the pollution problem at issue, the
possible solutions, and the preferable choice.
Lawrence S. Bazel*
193. While determining maximum loads, a state may discover that no reasonable plan
can ensure compliance with the WQS for that segment. The Clean Water Act does not
specifically provide for this circumstance, but the logic of the Act implies that the state must
replace the unattainable WQS with attainable WQS.
The word "attainable" comes from § 101(a)(2), which is sometimes called the "national
water quality standard" and which requires that the nation's waters should be fit for fishing
and swimming, wherever these uses are attainable. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976). The idea
that WQS must be attainable is inherent in the nature of the process: Without attainable
water-quality goals, there is no way of knowing whether cleanup plans are successes or
failures.
EPA agrees that WQS should be attainable. See 40 C.F.R. § 35.1550(e) (1982); Water
Quality Standards Regulation, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,234, at 49,247 (1982).
194. Compare California's statutory requirements for "programs of implementation,"
which are the state's version of maximum loads:
The program of implementation for achieving water quality objectives shall
include, but not be limited to:
(a) A description of the nature of actions which are necessary to achieve the
objectives, including recommendations for appropriate action by any entity, public
or private.
(b) A time schedule for actions to be taken.
(c) A description of surveillance to be undertaken to determine compliance
with objectives.
CAL. WATER CODE § 13242 (West 1971).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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